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Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: 





States have soft budget constraints when they can expect a bailout by the federal government 
in the event of a financial crisis. This gives rise to incentives for unsound state fiscal policy. 
We test whether states with softer budget constraints have higher debt and deficits, receive 
more bailouts funds, spend funds less efficiently, and are more likely to allocate funds to 
programs benefiting special interests. Exogenous variation in soft budget constraints across 
states and over time allows the identification of budget constraint softness on state fiscal 
policy. We take advantage of the fact that in Germany, states’ political influence is exogenous 
because voting weights differ in the upper chamber of the German parliament. The stronger 
the political influence of states, the softer their budget constraints. We show that states with 
softer budget constraint have higher deficits and debts, and receive more bailouts funds. 
Further, overrepresented states are less efficient in spending public funds and are more prone 
to respond to rent seeking by interest groups. 
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I. Introduction  
In many countries state governments face soft budget constraints. Budget constraints are soft 
when state governments can expect to be bailed out by the federal government in times of 
financial crisis (Kornai 1979, 1986, 1998, Kornai, Maskin and Roland 2003).  State government 
officials have a bailout expectation because the federal government is unable to credibly commit 
ex ante to a no-bailout strategy (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995).  Consequently, state 
governments facing soft budget constraints have a weak incentive to conduct fiscally responsible 
policies.
3 
Although the federal government could potentially bail any state government, budget 
constraints may not be equally soft across states. A simple political economy model predicts that 
politically influential states--states with more bargaining power--will take advantage of their 
influence over the federal government by running higher deficits, and not pursuing fiscally 
responsible policies. Because of their superior bargaining power, they expect to receive bailouts 
from the federal government in times of financial crises. When the degree of states’ bailout 
expectations is plausibly exogenous, an empirical model can identify the effect of soft budget 
constraints on fiscal outcomes. 
In Germany some states are politically more influential than others because states’ voting 
weights differ in the upper chamber of the German parliament, the Bundesrat. Less populous 
German states are overrepresented relative to their population size in the Bundesrat; similarly, as 
less populous states in the U.S. are overrepresented in the U.S. Senate. Overrepresented states 
have softer budget constraints and thus more bargaining power to obtain bailouts compared to 
states that are underrepresented in the Bundesrat. The malapportionment in the Bundesrat 
                                                 
3 For a recent analysis of fiscal incentives on policy decisions see Weingast (2009). 




provides exogenous variation in bailout expectations and thus the softness of states’ budget 
constraints.
4     
In this paper we test whether states with softer budget constraints have weaker fiscal 
incentives, measured as higher deficits and debts.  We also test whether these states receive more 
routine bailout funds, where we refer to bailouts as both discretionary grants from the federal 
government and grants that arise from the institutionalized redistribution of funds across states. 
Both of these institutionalized bailouts grants are in part a function of fiscal condition of states.
5 
We probe further into the consequences of soft budget constraints and examine whether they lead 
to less efficient state spending and whether softer constraints make state governments more 
receptive to rent seeking by special interests groups, measured as spending benefitting these 
groups. To estimate these effects we exploit the exogenous variation in state political power in 
Germany over time, and use an estimation strategy that holds state attributes, which may be 
correlated with soft budget constraints, constant. 
Related to our study is the work on fiscal intergovernmental relations, which focuses on 
the federal government’s problem with credibly committing ex ante to a no-bailout strategy, and 
the subsequent incentive effects for lower levels of government (Rodden 2002, 2003, 2006a; 
Wildasin 1997).
6  These studies focus on identifying instances of soft budget constraints and 
describe how country-specific institutional structures give rise to soft budget constraints. Less 
                                                 
4 Atlas et al. (1995) finds that overrepresentation of less populous states in the U.S. Senate led to a significantly 
higher amount of net federal spending per capita in these states.  More recent work is consistent with this finding 
(see, for example, Lee 1998; Hoover and Pecorino 2005; Knight 2005; Hauk and Wacziarg 2007).  While U.S. 
Senators vote directly on projects, and thereby determine the regional distribution of federal funds, in Germany the 
distribution of transfers is mostly based on formula. For Germany, Pitlik, Schmid, and Strotmann (2001) and Pitlik, 
Schneider, and Strotmann (2006) find that overrepresented states receive more funds.   
5 In part our language of referring to bailouts is motivated by Rodden (2006b, p. 142) who argues that “the model 
suggests that manifestations of bailout expectations among subnational governments are not limited to dramatic 
defaults or last minute bailouts under pressure from creditors, but in many plausible scenarios imply more routine 
early bailouts (gap-filling intergovernmental transfers) or delayed adjustment." 
6 Vigneault (2007) provides an overview of empirical investigations of soft budget constraints in the context of 
intergovernmental relations. For the effect of soft budget constraint in Germany on pro-cyclical fiscal policies see  




emphasis is placed on exploiting variations in the softness of the budget constraint and testing 
predictions about fiscal policies when states face bailout guarantees (Rodden 2002, 2003, 2006a; 
Wildasin 1997).
7  
We also investigate the consequences of other differences in states’ bargaining power 
arising from the political similarity between the federal government and the state governments 
(Grossman 1994).  In a model where the federal government, in order to pass legislation, has to 
purchase the votes of the majority of states, a state with the same political makeup as the federal 
government has a lower supply price of votes, and a state with the opposite political makeup has 
a higher supply price. But the federal government does not have to purchase votes from the 
latter, who have the highest supply price, because passage of legislation requires not unanimity, 
but only a majority of votes. Thus, states with the median supply price receive the highest price. 
These states tend to be both those governed by parties represented in the federal government’s 
governing coalition, as well those not in the governing coalition. Thus, this bargaining model 
predicts the largest redistribution to states that have a median supply price of votes (Denzau and 
Munger 1986; Stratmann 1992).  
We analyze annual data by state from 1970 to 2004 and find that states with softer budget 
constraints have higher deficits and debts, resulting from higher expenditures. Further, these 
states receive more bailouts funds from other states and from the federal government.  We also 
find that states with softer budget constraints tend to spend a larger share of funds on programs 
benefitting special interests and also spend their funds less efficiently.  
 
                                                 
7 Similar as in this study, Rodden (2006a) includes German Bundesrat seats per capita in regressions examining 
deficits and expenditures. However, Rodden (2006a) examines data from 1974 to 1995 for the old German states. 
This short time period is associated with little variation in the number of seats per capita, which prevents Rodden 
from including state fixed effects in the regressions.  State fixed effects would control for state heterogeneity which 





II.A. Malapportionment in the Bundesrat 
In many federal systems the upper chamber represents the states. The number of seats allocated 
to a state in the upper chamber is malapportioned when the share of seats apportioned to that 
state does not equal the state’s share of the country’s population.  In the U.S., for example, two 
Senators represent each state even though states differ greatly in population size.  Consequently, 
relatively unpopulated states are overrepresented in the U.S. Senate.  Disproportional 
representation in the upper chamber is a common phenomenon and is present in more than 70 
countries worldwide (Samuels and Snyder 2001).   
Overrepresentation of smaller states exists also in the German Bundesrat. Although the 
representation in the Bundesrat is related to a state’s population, state representation is not 
proportional to state population.  Table 1 shows that in 2004, 69 representatives in the Bundesrat 
represented 16 states, and each state held between three and six seats, each seat counting for one 
vote. The table shows that the number of seats per state was not proportional to a state’s 
population. For example, in 2004 the state Bremen had a population of about 0.66 million and 
held three seats in the Bundesrat, while the state North Rhine-Westphalia has a population of 
approximately 18 million and held six seats in the upper chamber. Another example is the state 
of Thuringia which had three times as many votes per capita as Bavaria.  
This malapportionment can be traced back to the founding of the Federal Republic of 
Germany after World War II.  In 1949 the parliamentary council (Parlamentarischer Rat) drafted 
the German constitution (Grundgesetz). The council consisted of representatives from the 
German states. At that time the council decreed that each state receives at least three seats, states 




greater than six million receive five seats (Kröger 1989). The proposed constitution, which 
included this allocation of seats, was ratified by the state governments.
8 The advantage that small 
states received through this allocation of seats cannot be explained through an overrepresentation 
of these states in the parliamentary council. For example, the small states Bremen and Hamburg 
had one and two representatives respectively, whereas the large state Bavaria had 13 
representatives on the council.
9 Further, the small state of Saarland was not represented since it 
was part of France in 1949.  
Between 1949 and 1990 the distribution of seats only changed when states joined the 
German Republic or were dissolved. However, the formula for the allocation did not change until 
1990 when the eastern states joined the Bundesrat.  At that time the formula changed in only one 
respect, namely that from 1990 onwards, states with a population of seven million or greater 
received six instead of five seats in the Bundesrat.  
The fact that smaller states were not overrepresented in the parliamentary council which 
decided on the allocation of seats suggests that the seat allocation was not driven by a more than 
proportional political influence of small states.  Further, some states had no voice in the 
determination of the allocation. Those states included the Saarland, Berlin, and the five eastern 
states which joined with the seat allocation rules already in effect.  
German voters do not directly elect state representatives for the Bundesrat. State 
governments appoint them instead. Delegations from each state vote as a block.  In contrast, 
German voters elect representatives to the lower chamber (Bundestag). The number of 
representatives in the Bundestag originating from a particular state is close to proportional to 
                                                 
8 The Bavarian parliament rejected the Grundgesetz but accepted it conditional on its ratification in at least two 
thirds of the remaining states. 
9In 1949 Hamburg and Bremen had the highest and second highest per capita incomes. 




state population, because German electoral law mandates that the population size in each 
electoral district may not deviate by more than 25 percent from the population size in the average 
district, and because any remaining disproportionality at the state level is eliminated by adjusting 
the number of state party list members entering the Bundestag,  
The institutional role of the Bundesrat is to accept or reject every federal law that has an 
impact on the states. A majority of states is required for consent and currently states consider 
about two thirds of all federal laws (Döring and Voigt 2006).  The power to consent or reject 
give state governments influence over federal legislation. 
 
II.B. Tax Revenues 
The German governing system has three levels: local, state and federal.  The local governments 
administer the provision of utility services, and manage local infrastructure and welfare benefits.  
At the state level, governments provide primary, secondary, and university education, manage 
cultural affairs, policing services, and the administration of justice.  The federal government 
provides national defense, handles international affairs, unemployment benefits, and social 
security.  
The German 'fiscal constitution' is two-tiered.  Although the federal and state 
governments are autonomous fiscal entities, the scope of states’ legislative authority is limited, 
because many state activities are regulated by federal mandates. Thus, state governments largely 
do not decide independently what goods and services to provide.  Similarly, local governments 
are not independent of state governments. Although local governments have the right to govern 
themselves, federal and state laws restrict their fiscal autonomy. Further, local governments have 




them to function (Scholz, Maunz, and Düring 2009, 40-41).  The subordinate position of the 
local governments makes them 'subsidiaries' (Geschöpfe) of the states (Zimmermann 2002, 5).
10  
State governments supervise the tasks of local governments and local governments can draw on 
resources from state governments.
11 
The German constitution mandates that receipts from the most important taxes are 
distributed between the different levels of government. Based on Article 106 of the German 
constitution, revenues fall into four groups of taxes and are distributed across levels of 
government based on the type of tax.  First, revenues from joint taxes, which include the value 
added tax (VAT), the corporate income tax and the personal income tax, are divided between the 
federal, state, and local governments.  Tax rates for those taxes are set at the federal level and 
these rates are uniform throughout Germany. Second, the federal government keeps revenues 
from federal taxes such as the insurance tax, the tobacco tax, and the energy tax.  Third, states 
keep revenues from state taxes such as the automobile tax, the land acquisition tax, and the 
lottery tax.  Finally, local governments keep local taxes such as the land tax (Grundsteuer) and 
the industry tax (Gewerbesteuer).  Thus, all levels of government obtain revenues from their own 
taxes and revenues from joint taxes. 
 In 2004, overall tax revenues in Germany amounted to €443 billion.  Joint taxes 
accounted for 68 percent of the overall tax revenue, federal taxes for 19 percent, state taxes for 5 
percent and local taxes for 8 percent (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2005). Consequently, 
most of the revenues for the state budget do not come from state taxes, but are a result of federal 
transfers from a portion of joint tax revenues. From 1970 to 2004 between 32% and 40% of the 
                                                 
10 Also, see Blankart (2000) and Blankart and Klaiber (2006) for a discussion of how German municipalities are part 
of the state governments. 
11 For an analysis of the consequences of intra-state equalization transfers for the tax policy of local governments see 




overall joint tax revenue was distributed to state governments (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
2007).   
Although states receive all revenues from state taxes, the federal government sets 
uniform tax rates across states for all state taxes. Thus states have no influence over their 
revenues through setting taxes. On the spending side states are subject to federal spending 
mandates for which goods to allocate resources. But they face no serious constraints in their 
decisions on the amount of their spending, even if spending exceeds revenues and results in debt 
(Rodden 2006a).     
 
II.C. Intergovernmental Bailout Transfers 
Redistribution from the federal level to the state level and across states is motivated by article 
107 of the German Constitution which mandates “a reasonable equalization of the disparate 
financial capacities of the Länder.”
12 The current federal Financial Equalization Law implements 
the constitutional mandate and codifies conditions for all transfers. According to the Financial 
Equalization Law, the intergovernmental transfer system aims at equalizing fiscal revenues per 
capita across states through a redistribution of state tax revenues and transfers of federal funds.  
The structure of redistribution has not changed in any essential way since a major federal public 
finance reform in 1969.
13  Thus, transfers of resources are institutionalized.  
Redistribution through the intergovernmental equalization system, by law, depends on 
each state's per capita tax revenue relative to all other states.  Formula-based intergovernmental 
transfers are directly determined by the states' fiscal performance. Additional funds from the 
                                                 
12 From the official translation of the German Constituion.  The Länder are the German states.  
13 For a historical background on the German Fiscal Equalization Law see Renzsch (1986). In the 1980s some minor 
changes of the transfer rules occurred. A Constitutional Court ruling in 1994 led to extraordinary supplementary 




federal government can also be given to states with special burdens, which are aimed at reducing 
financial distress in fiscally weak states.
14  Because transfers are partly a function of states’ fiscal 
performance, we refer to these transfers as routine bailouts and institutionalized bailouts. 
This fiscal equalization strategy has several elements. First, the German Constitution 
mandates that at least 75 percent of the value added tax (VAT) receipts from each state be 
redistributed across all states, so that each state receives the same revenues per capita. This 
results in a redistribution from states with large VAT revenues per capita to those with few 
revenues from the VAT. Second, the remaining 25 percent of the VAT receipts are to be 
redistributed based on a formula set in the Fiscal Equalization Law. Here, fiscally strong states 
make additional transfers to fiscally weak states. Whether a state is fiscally strong or weak 
depends on its per capita tax revenues compared to the per capita average of all other states. 
Third, fiscally strong states make additional equalizing transfers to fiscally weak states. Again, 
transfers are based on a formula assessing each state’s fiscal revenue and comparing it to the 
average per capita revenue across states.  On this stage state tax revenues as well as revenues of 
the local governments enter the calculation of fiscal strength (Finanzkraft). After all of these 
transfers have taken place, each state has reached at least 95 percent of the average per capita 
fiscal strength of all states. 
In addition to the aforementioned horizontal redistribution across states, which leads to a 
redistribution from stronger to weaker states, there is a vertical redistribution of taxpayer funds 
from the federal government to states (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen).  Some of these vertical 
transfers are formula-based and are designed to close 90% of the remaining gap in the average 
                                                 
14 We refer to intergovernmental transfers as bailouts, since the transfers increase with a deterioration in fiscal 




fiscal capacity per capita across states after the horizontal transfers described in the previous 
paragraph have taken place.   
Vertical transfers are also available to assist fiscally weak states in mitigating the 
consequences of some special burdens at the state level.  For example, there are vertical transfers 
to the five eastern states of Germany and the city state of Berlin, which were integrated into the 
transfer system in 1995 after the German reunification in 1990. The official intention of these 
transfers is the alleviation of the consequences of the German separation.
15 Other examples are 
transfer to states to pay for their above average costs of political administration (Kosten 
politischer Führung)
16  and transfers are to states with “over-proportional” fiscal burdens causing 
them to have high expenditures.
17  While the official intention of some additional transfers is the 
easement of the transition, states receiving funds for political administration and high fiscal 
burdens include not only eastern states.  Western states, such as Bremen, Niedersachsen, 
Saarland, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, some of which do not border eastern Germany, 
also receive these funds.  Finally, at various points in time the states Saarland and Bremen 
received transfers to reduce their debt levels, indicating that vertical transfers are related to fiscal 
expenditures.  
 
III. Model the Effect of Malapportionment on Soft Budget Constraints 
In a bargaining game, small states are willing to sell their votes at a lower price than larger states, 
because at a given price their per capita benefit is larger than the per capita benefit to larger 
                                                 
15 See Gesetz über den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und Ländern (Financial Equalization Law) as of 2004,, § 11, 
paragraph 4. 
16 See Gesetz über den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und Ländern (Financial Equalization Law) as of 2004,, § 11, 
paragraph 3. 
17 See Gesetz über den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und Ländern (Financial Equalization Law) as of 2004,, § 11, 




states. For example, Atlas et al. (1995) argue that in the U.S. Senate “a given amount of effort 
devoted to local benefit seeking (…) will be more beneficial (in per capita terms) to constituents, 
and hence to a Senator, the less populous the Senator’s state is.”  The same hypothesis applies to 
the German case.  The smaller a state’s population, the larger the per capita benefit of a transfer 
of a certain size to a state.
18  Because small overrepresented states have a lower supply price for 
their votes, they can better pursue their goals within the complex structure of interrelations 
between the federal and the state governments in Germany. 
German face soft budget constraints because there is no strict relationship between state 
expenditure and tax revenues. When a state has expenditures in excess of its revenues, it can 
expect that the gap will be financed by other states or the federal government, either through the 
institutionalized bailout system (horizontal and vertical transfers) in which bailouts are a function 
of the fiscal position of states, or explicitly via additional financial transfers.  Because the 
availability of such financial assistance is built into a state’s fiscal decisions, the incentive for 
sound fiscal policy is weak.  While the German tax system limits the taxing authority of the 
states, soft budget constraints weaken the incentives to close any gap between tax revenues and 
spending. However, softness of the budget constraints is not uniform across states.  Because 
overrepresented states have more than proportional bargaining power in the Bundesrat and thus a 
strong expectation of a federal bailout, they have an incentive to pursue a relatively lax 
budgetary policy and to rely more heavily on transfers than underrepresented states.  
                                                 
18 The equalization scheme makes Germany a special case since, as opposed to the U.S., intergovernmental transfers 
are mostly regulated by formulae.  These formulae are not subject to revision on a regular basis, and one might 
therefore expect that the distribution of votes in the upper chamber does not have any impact on the degree to which 
transfers influence the softness of the budget constraints.  However, formula-based transfers might not be 
independent of the legislative bargaining process.  Forces that influence the distribution of non-formula based 
transfers, such as earmarked funds in the U.S., might also be at play when formulas are created, revised, and applied 




We model the government’s behavior facing a choice over the size of the deficit( ) d .  In 
our simple model a state government’s utility ( ) U  increases as deficits widen.  Since state taxes 
are not directly determined at the state level, increased deficits mainly result from increased 
spending.  We assume that utility increases with increasing spending, and thus deficits, because 
the incumbent state government’s reelection probability increases in the size of spending.   
However, deficits carry a cost for state governments  ( ) ( ) d C . The higher the deficit 
compared to other states, the higher future taxes and the less satisfied the voters. Further, it 
becomes more difficult for the states to convince their constituency that general factors, not 
state-specific factors like spending, caused the deficit.  Additionally, high deficits carry a cost 
because they hurt the reputation of state governments, reducing the likelihood that members of 
state governments will assume federal office.   
The utility costs of higher deficits also depend on the degree of overrepresentation of the 
state in the Bundesrat() Ω .  The more a state is overrepresented, the smaller are the costs from 
deficits, since transfers are more readily available due to a superior bargaining position.  Thus, a 
state government faces the following maximization problem: 




m a x           ( 1 )  














          ( 2 )  
which implies that – assuming the government’s utility is concave in deficits, and the utility cost 
is convex in deficit, or the effect of a marginal increase in deficit on the utility cost function is 




  This simple model allows us to formulate several hypotheses.  First, the model predicts 
that overrepresented states will run higher deficits. Overrepresented states have an incentive to 
create a larger gap between expenditures and tax revenues which can be filled, due to their 
voting power, through transfers from underrepresented states and the federal government.  
Second, using a similar logic, we predict that overrepresented states have higher debt per capita.  
Because of their superior bargaining power in the Bundesrat, overrepresented states are more 
likely to receive financial support in cases of indebtedness. Therefore, debt comes at a lower 
price for overrepresented states, giving them an incentive to have higher debt. A corollary of the 
deficit and debt hypotheses is overrepresented states will be more successful in seeking bailout 
funds. 
We explore several additional hypotheses. We test whether the increases in deficits that 
are associated with soft budget constraints are due to increases in spending. We separate total 
state spending into spending on public goods and private goods, and test whether spending on 
selected state-provided public and private goods increases with the softness of a state’s budget 
constraint. We test whether governments of overrepresented states spend a larger share of their 
funds on spending categories that have less public good character and rather serve special 
interests. This test is motivated by the fact that every increase in bailout funds provides the state 
government with additional room for discretionary maneuver.  With additional horizontal and 
vertical funds received, the costs of catering to organized special interests decreases, which may 
result in a shift in the mix of private and public goods provided by the state.  Finally, we test 
whether overrepresented states provide public goods less efficiently than underrepresented states. 
 




IV. Econometric Specification and Data 
We use data from 1970 to 2004 to analyze the effects of soft budget constraints, measured as the 
overrepresentation in the German Bundesrat, on state total deficit per capita.
19  We include 
eastern German states starting with 1995, since this is the first year in which these states were 
included in the inter-state redistribution system. Our regression specification is  
 
deficit  votespercapita  Govt coalition state  Govt opposition state   it it it it it i t it αβ γ θτ μ =+ + + + + + δ X
            ( 3 )  
 
The dependent variable, deficitit  is state i’s total deficit per capita at time t. This variable is 
defined as the sum of the primary deficit, VAT transfers, direct horizontal transfers, and vertical 
transfers as described in section II.C .
20  The votespercapitait variable is a state’s per capita 
number of votes in the Bundesrat.  The regression includes for state fixed effects  i θ  and year 
fixed effects  t τ . We denote the error term with it μ . State fixed effects capture all observed and 
unobserved variables that are constant for the state over time. Thus, these indicator variables also 
capture state size and average state population density. While the votespercapitait variable is 
correlated with state size because smaller states tend to have more votes in the Bundesrat, by 
controlling for state size via state indicators, we can separate the effect of voting and bargaining 
power in the Bundesrat from the effect of state size and population density.  
Further, we include indicator variables for whether or not the government at the federal 
level is ruled by the same parties as those at the state level. We define the variable “Govt 
                                                 
19 Our starting year is 1970 because that is the first year after the substantial federal reform in 1969. 
20 The primary deficit used includes state and local level deficits since, as described in section II.B., local 
governments are not independent of state governments and the amount of federal transfers to states is also based on 




coalition stateit“ as one if the state is governed solely by parties that are in the federal 
government’s ruling coalition, and zero otherwise.  Further, we define the variable “Govt 
opposition stateit” as one if the state is governed solely by parties that are in the opposition on the 
federal level, and zero otherwise.
21 Thus, all states with a governing coalition whose parties are  
in the opposition and in the governing coalition on the federal level serve as the reference 
group.
22, 
23   
The vector it X  includes tax revenue per capita.  We include the sum of state and local tax 
revenues as a proxy of the fiscal revenue measure because both state and local revenues are 
considered in the official calculation of routine bailouts.  We also include total state population 
because the incentive to run a deficit is lower when the state is large. This is because the larger 
the state, the greater the incentive to internalize the cost of a bailout (Rodden 2006a). Further, we 
include population density and the unemployment rate. While the state dummies control for these 
variables to the extent that they are constant over time, by including these variables explicitly we 
also control for changes in unemployment, and state population size and density over time.   
To test whether overrepresented states receive higher routine bailouts and have higher 
debt, we substitute various measures for institutionalized bailouts and debt for deficits in 
equation (3). 
Table A1 in the appendix provides means and standard deviations of all data used in this 
paper. Table A1 also includes variable definitions and sources of data.  
 
                                                 
21 König and Bräuninger (1997) refer to these states as A-states and B-states. 
22 An example of the left out category is if a state is governed by the CDU and SPD parties and when the federal 
government is comprised of the CDU while the SPD is in the opposition at the federal level. 
23 Often, the government does not change at the end or the beginning of the year. In these cases we define these 
variables to equal one when the government formed in the first half of that year.  Otherwise we code the election 





Table 2 reports the effect of soft budget constraints on deficits per capita. In this and in most 
subsequent tables the first column has as its only covariate the softness of the budget constraint, 
measured as the number of state votes per capita in the Bundesrat. The second column adds 
covariates measuring the bargaining strength of states, arising from the fact that the parties in the 
state government may be comprised of the same make up (Government coalition state) or 
opposite make up (Government opposition state) as the parties in the federal government. The 
third column adds state and local revenues per capita, which is the measure used according to the 
German law governing redistribution across states. Column 4 adds other socio-economic 
controls. The last column adds the interaction term between a number of votes in the Bundesrat 
and an indicator variable for whether a state is an eastern state.
24 We include this latter variable 
to test whether eastern states behave systematically different with respect to overrepresentation 
as opposed to western states. 
The results reported in Table 2 show that the number of votes per capita in the Bundesrat 
has the predicted effect on deficits per capita.  The more a state is overrepresented the larger is 
its total deficit.  The point estimates on Bundesrat votes is statistically significant at the one 
percent level. For example, the point estimate in Table 2, column 4 indicates that one extra vote 
per capita increases the deficit by €1.8 per capita, which is 0.3 percent of the mean of the total 
deficit.  In the regressions the variable “Votes Per Capita” is measured as number of votes per 
million population multiplied by a factor of 1,000. Thus, for a state with a population of five 
million and five seats in the upper chamber, which is close to the seat average, an additional vote 
                                                 
24 Because this indicator variable is a linear combination of the indicators for the eastern states, and therefore already 
measure the effect of being an eastern state on the dependent variable, we do not include a separate “East” indicator 




in the Bundesrat translates into an increase in the “Votes Per Capita” measure by 200.
25  
Accordingly, the point estimate on “votes per capita” in column 4 of 1.8 predicts that in a state of 
five million, having one extra seat in the Bundesrat leads to a €360 higher per capita deficit.  
As mentioned in the introduction, we hypothesized that votes of states in the opposition, 
that have an even higher opportunity cost of voting for the federal government, typically do not 
have to be bought in order to obtain a majority in the Bundesrat. Similarly, the federal 
government also does not have to purchase the votes of states that have the same party 
composition as that of the federal government, since these state governments are likely to vote 
for the federal government’s position in any case. Table 2 shows that the point estimates on 
“Government coalition state” and “Government opposition state” are negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  These results suggest that states where the state government 
is only partially made up by parties that govern at the federal level, i.e. the states in the reference 
group, have higher deficits than states with governments that are either perfectly similar or 
perfectly dissimilar to the federal government.  Thus, states with mixed governments, i.e. 
governments whose votes are cheaper than votes of governments that are entirely composed of 
opposition parties at the federal level, have the highest deficits. One explanation for this finding 
is that states with mixed governments have the strongest expectation that they will be bailed out 
by the federal government in a financial crises.   
 As expected, tax revenue, our measure of fiscal capacity as defined by German law, has 
a negative sign and is statistically significant at the one percent level in all specifications of 
Table 2.  The population variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that increases in 
population within a state do not affect fiscal policy.  The point estimates on population density 
                                                 
25 With a five million state population and with five votes in the Bundesrat the votes per capita variable equals 




are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the denser a state’s population, the lower 
its deficits. The remaining controls--unemployment and the interaction between votes per capita 
and eastern states--are not statistically significant.  
Next we examine the effect of overrepresentation on debt. Table 3 shows the results. In 
all specifications more votes in the Bundesrat lead to higher debt. With a point estimate of 5.2 
(Table 3, column 4), using the previous example, one extra vote in the Bundesrat for a state with 
five million people implies a higher debt of about €1,040 per capita.  These results lend further 
support to the hypothesis that the softer the budget constraint, the less sound the fiscal policy. 
The measures on bargaining strength based on the party composition of government are 
statistically significant and have the predicted negative signs in Table 3, columns 2 and 3, but are 
not statistically significant in columns 4 and 5.   
Next we examine the effect of soft budget constraints on routine bailouts. In Tables 4A, 
4B, and 4C we test for the determinants of the transfer components separately.
26  The three 
components are: indirect horizontal transfers due to the VAT redistribution according to 
population (Table 4A), direct horizontal transfers between the states which depend on the fiscal 
performance of the state (Table 4B), and vertical transfers which also depend on fiscal 
performance and for which the federal government has the largest discretion as to how to 
allocate these transfers (Table 4C).  The number of votes per capita in the Bundesrat in all three 
tables is statistically significant at the one percent level, except for one specification in the VAT 
transfer regression (Table 4A), which is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  Votes 
per capita have the largest marginal impact in regressions that have as their dependent variable 
routine bailouts that are distributed with the largest discretion. The associated point estimates 
                                                 
26 When we combine all transfers and use this measure as the dependent variable we find very similar results as 




range from 0.29 for direct horizontal transfers (Table 4B) to 1.15 for federal transfers (Table 4C).  
Following up on the example above, for a state with a population of five million, one extra vote 
translates into an €114 increase in value added tax redistribution (Table 4A, column 4), a €58 
increase in horizontal transfers (Table 4B, column 4), and a €230 increase in vertical transfers 
(Table 4C, column 4). 
The finding that of all transfers, transfers from federal to states governments have the 
largest point estimate of the three types of transfers can be explained with the discretionary 
nature of these transfers.  Federal transfers are to a small part formula-based and largely 
conditional on the presence of ‘special burdens.’  In 2004, twenty percent of these transfers were 
based on the fiscal strength of the recipient states, and the remainder was provided on a more 
discretionary basis, i.e. on whether a state faced an “excessive” fiscal burden.   
We also find that the estimated elasticities for the vote per capita variable are the highest 
for the vertical transfers.
27  Further, the beta coefficients also suggest that transfers are more 
responsive to changes in the votes per capita variable with beta coefficients increasing as the 
discretionary element of the transfers increases.  Whereas a one standard deviation change in 
votes per capita leads to a 1.33 standard deviations change in VAT (Table 4A), and a 1.74 
standard deviations change in horizontal transfers (Table 4B), a one standard deviation change in 
votes per capita induces a 4.13 standard deviations change in federal transfers (Table 4C).
28  
We also find that states’ bargaining power, based on the political make-up of the state 
government as opposed federal government matters for bailouts (Tables 4): states that are only 
                                                 
27 The level of year-to-year discretion for the transfers based on special burdens is reduced by the fact that these 
transfers are mostly approved for several years in advance. 
28 The elasticities show a similar picture.  A one percent change in the votes per capita variable induces a 7 percent 
change in horizontal transfers and a 9.8 percent change in vertical transfers.  Maybe surprisingly, the elasticity for 
VAT transfers is with 8.56 percent higher than that for horizontal transfers.  To put these results further into 




partially comprised of parties which are members of the federal government receive more funds 
at each stage of the intergovernmental transfer system. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
these governments can extract a higher supply price for their votes in the German Bundesrat.  
While we find that overrepresented states run higher deficits (Table 2), the results do not 
allow for conclusions whether these findings are driven by lower taxes or more spending, and, if 
it is more spending, which spending categories contribute to the increase in total spending. But 
given that the German institutional structure does not allow states to set their own tax rates, and 
that states only have discretion over the spending side of the budget, deficits are predicted to be 
due to additional expenditures, no lower tax revenues.  
For the question of which expenditures are most sensitive to soft budget constraints, we 
focus on seven spending categories, which we can plausibly divide into public good spending 
and private good spending. As public goods, we consider spending on political administration 
(approximately sixty-five percent of which are wages for state government employees), 
education, police, and culture.  As private goods, those most likely to benefit special interests, we 
consider spending on agriculture, regional aids, and state-run enterprises. 
We estimate the following regression for each of the seven spending categories: 
  spending votespercapita it it it i t it αγ θτ μ =⋅ +⋅ +++ X    ( 4 )  
where spending measures either total state government spending per capita or spending for each 
of the spending categories. As in the previous regressions, the variable “votespercapita” 
measures the votes in the upper chamber divided by state population. We include per capita 
income among the variables in the  it X vector. 
The results in Table 5 show that our measure for the softness of budget constraints, votes 




are statistically significant, suggesting that the increase in deficits and debt found in previous 
tables, is driven by an increase in spending. Though not reported in the tables, we also estimated 
this specification using per capita state tax revenues as the dependent variable and found that the 
point estimates on “votespercapita” are positive and not statistically significant. Given that 
German states have limited taxing authority and that state tax revenues are small, the finding that 
revenues are uncorrelated with overrepresentation in the Bundesrat is not surprising.  
Table 5 shows that the point estimates on per capita spending are positive for six 
spending categories.
29  Five of these estimates are statistically significant. Votes per capita has 
the largest marginal effect on regional aid and state enterprises, both of which are largely private 
goods.  We find the next largest marginal effect for government administration.  The marginal 
effect of spending on police and culture is one third or less the size of the effect of spending on 
political administration. Education expenditures and agricultural expenditures are not affected by 
soft budget constraints and the size of the coefficient on agriculture is very small and negative.  
These findings show that, with the exception of agriculture, the largest spending increases occur 
for private goods, followed by spending on government administration. The closer the good is to 
public goods, like police and education, the lower the marginal effects of votes per capita. 
State governments face pressure from interest groups to increase spending and alter 
regulations to their benefit. A state government with a soft budget constraint--and thus more 
resources--may be more likely to placate rent seeking interest groups. Thus, we next investigate 
whether overrepresented states spend a smaller portion of their budgets on public goods.  
The results in Table 6 are based on a similar specification to those in Table 5, but the 
dependent variable is public goods spending and private goods spending as a share of the state 
                                                 
29 These categories account for roughly fifty percent of the overall state budget. The bulk of the remaining spending 
categories is welfare spending (for example, “Soziale Sicherung, soziale Kriegsfolgeaufgaben, Wiedergutmachung” 




budget.  The first four columns in Table 6 report results for the goods we consider to be closer to 
public goods. We find that for all public goods categories the expectation of a bailout has a 
negative effect on the share of public goods spending. Among these categories the point 
estimates for relative spending on education, police, and culture are statistically significant.  
The last three columns of Table 6 contain the categories that we considered private goods 
and measures of favors to special interests. Here, overrepresentation has a positive effect on 
relative spending and the point estimates are statistically significant for agriculture and regional 
aids. Overrepresented states devote a larger proportion of their budgets on these latter categories.  
The coefficient for state enterprises is positive but overrepresentation has no statistically 
significant effect on the proportion of funds spent on state enterprises. Together, Tables 5 and 6 
suggest that overrepresentation leads to higher expenditures in almost all spending categories, 
but the amount spent, as a share of the total budget, decreases for public goods and increases for 
private goods. 
  Table 7 examines the effect of soft budget constraints on government efficiency. We 
measure efficiency by dividing spending by the relevant input. We estimate a similar 
specification as in Table 4, but use as the dependent variables police spending per crime, hospital 
spending per patient and primary and secondary education expenditures per student.
30  We 
selected these three measures based on availability of a plausible input measure for a spending 
category. 
Table 7 shows that the point estimates on votes per capita are positive and statistically 
significant with police spending and hospital spending as the dependent variable. The point 
estimate in the education expenditures regression is also positive, but statistically insignificant.  
                                                 
30 We did not include hospital spending in the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 due to the difficulty of classifying it 
either as a private or public good. However, when estimating a regression similar as in Table 5, we find that per 




Assuming services stemming from three expenditure categories are comparable across states, the 
results in Table 7 suggest that states with soft budget constraints spend their funds less efficiently 
than other states. States with soft budget constraints spend more money per case, i.e. crime 
committed and patients treated, for roughly equivalent services. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Theoretically, soft budget constraints give states an incentive to conduct unsustainable fiscal 
policies. However, bailout expectations cannot be directly observed. We use a plausibly 
exogenous variation in states’ political bargaining power--arising from malapportionment in the 
German upper chamber of parliament--to identify the effect of soft budget constraints on the size 
of deficits and debt. Our results show that overrepresentation of states in the German Bundesrat 
is one determinant of unsustainable fiscal policies.  As overrepresentation increases, a state’s 
bargaining power increases and with it the softness of the budget constraint. The softer a state’s 
budget constraint the higher the deficit and the larger the debt. This systematic evidence is 
consistent with the anecdotal evidence that the two most overrepresented states in the Bundesrat, 
Bremen and Saarland, were bailed out by the federal government initially in 1992 and received 
additional bailout funds annually until 2004.  
Institutionalized bailouts, which, according to many pages of German laws and 
regulations are determined by formula, are sensitive to the political power of state governments. 
States that are overrepresented and states that have superior bargaining power due to the 
constellation of party representation in the federal vs. state government receive the most funds in 
all three types of institutionalized bailouts. The political bargaining power is most effective for 




Overrepresentation and the associated bailout expectation also impact how state 
government funds are spent.  The larger the expectation of a bailout, the higher the amount spent 
in a number of spending categories, and special interests are most likely to benefit from this 
additional spending. We also find that bailout expectations lead to less efficient state government 
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Baden-Württemberg 10.72  6  0.56 
        
Bavaria 12.44  6  0.48 
        
Berlin 3.39  4  1.18 
        
Brandenburg 2.57  4  1.56 
        
Bremen 0.66  3  4.55 
        
Hamburg 1.73  3  1.73 
        
Hesse 6.10  5  0.82 
        
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1.72  3 1.74 
        
Lower Saxony  8.00  6  0.75 
        
North Rhine-Westphalia  18.08  6  0.33 
        
Rhineland-Palatinate 4.06  4  0.99 
        
Saarland 1.06  3  2.83 
        
Saxony 4.30  4  0.93 
        
Saxony-Anhalt 2.50  4  1.60 
        
Schleswig-Holstein 2.83  4  1.41 














Effects of Overrepresentation on the Total Deficits 
(The dependent variable is total deficit per capita) 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Votes Per Capita  2.500*** 2.534***  2.386***  1.832***  1.891*** 
  (0.565) (0.464) (0.396) (0.707) (0.694) 
Government Coalition    
 
-430.4*** -451.2*** -401.6*** -390.8***
State   (87.440)  (86.790)  (111.300)  (115.300) 
Government Opposition   
 
-576.6*** -522.5*** -488.2*** -479.1***
State    (82.840) (88.280) (98.270)  (100.700) 
Tax Revenue Per Capita     
 
-1.141*** -1.094*** -1.104***
     (0.136)  (0.147)  (0.149) 
 
Population       -0.125  -0.134 
       (0.087)  (0.091) 
Population Density        -2.617**  -2.504** 
       (1.269)  (1.245) 
Unemployment      
 
-23.3 -19.86 
       (20.970)  (21.510) 
Votes Per Capita*Eastern States         
 
-1.621 
      
(1.469) 
 
State Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 410 410 410 410  410
R-squared 0.816 0.849 0.878 0.883  0.883
The dependent variable is the deficit per capita in a state by year. The measure of deficits 
includes the state’s primary budget deficit plus transfers from the equalization scheme. 
Regressions are based on annual data by state from 1970 to 2004. Robust standard errors in 





Effects of Overrepresentation on Debt 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Votes Per Capita  8.666*** 7.300***  7.480***  5.245**  6.088*** 
 (1.936)  (1.896)  (1.813)  (2.207)  (2.235) 
Government Coalition 
 
 -1027.0*** -1001.0*** 267.6  423.2* 
State   (279.800)  (282.800)  (240.000)  (242.000) 
Government Opposition 
 
 -630.2**  -695.8**  -274.1  -145.0 
State   (280.900)  (280.100)  (204.000)  (199.300) 
Tax Revenue Per Capita 
 
   1.384  2.565***  2.427*** 
     (1.031)  (0.613)  (0.578) 
Population 
 
     -4.040***  -4.163***
       (0.341)  (0.346) 
Population Density 
 
     1.688  3.307 
       (4.231)  (4.248) 
Unemployment 
 
     485.8***  534.9*** 
       (95.570)  (100.700) 
Votes Per Capita*Eastern States 
 
      -23.18***
        
(6.355) 
 
State Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 410 410 410 410  410
R-squared 0.866 0.87 0.872 0.934  0.936
The dependent variable is debt per capita in a state by year. The measure of deficits includes the 
state’s primary budget deficit plus transfers from the equalization scheme. Regressions are based 
on annual data by state from 1970 to 2004. Robust standard errors in parenthesis below point 
estimates. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 





Effects of overrepresentation on Bailouts: VAT Transfers 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Votes Per Capita  0.969*** 0.937***  0.867***  0.572*  0.454 
  (0.232) (0.269) (0.228) (0.344) (0.349) 
Government Coalition 
 
 -267.5*** -277.5*** -370.0***  -391.9***
State   (75.500)  (76.780) (85.820) (88.810) 
Government Opposition 
 
 -331.2*** -305.3*** -327.1***  -345.2***
State   (81.330)  (88.780) (91.190) (93.060) 
Tax Revenue Per Capita 
 
   -0.547*** -0.639***  -0.619***
     (0.166)  (0.124)  (0.123) 
Population 
 
    0.506***  0.523*** 
       (0.061)  (0.063) 
Population Density 
 
    -0.958  -1.185 
       (0.762)  (0.771) 
Unemployment 
 
    -20.53  -27.44** 
       (12.990)  (12.810) 
Votes Per Capita*Eastern States 
 
     3.256*** 
      
(0.889) 
 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  410 410 410 410 410 
R-squared  0.67 0.708 0.731 0.782 0.785 
The dependent variable is the net value added tax transfers per capita (which can be positive or 
negative) that an individual state receives or pays to other states per year. Regressions are based 
on annual data by state from 1970 to 2004. Robust standard errors in parenthesis below point 
estimates. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 





Effects of overrepresentation on Bailouts: Horizontal Transfers 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Votes Per Capita  0.545*** 0.538***  0.496***  0.287***  0.319*** 
  (0.125) (0.105) (0.091) (0.103) (0.105) 
Government Coalition   
 
-75.32*** -81.20*** -37.96*** -32.03***
State   (16.150)  (13.030) (11.040) (10.760) 
Government Opposition   
 
-94.22*** -78.94*** -60.09*** -55.17***
State    (16.490) (13.120) (10.220)  (9.844) 
Tax Revenue Per Capita   
 
 -0.322*** -0.283***  -0.288***
     (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Population  
 
   -0.116***  -0.121***
       (0.017)  (0.017) 
Population Density   
 
   -0.580***  -0.518***
       (0.191)  (0.190) 
Unemployment  
 
   8.441**  10.32*** 
       (3.486)  (3.519) 
Votes Per Capita*Eastern States   
 
    -0.883***
      
(0.243) 
 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  410 410 410 410 410 
R-squared 0.82  0.84  0.896  0.928  0.929 
The dependent variable is horizontal (i.e. from some states to other states) transfers per capita per 
state (which can be positive or negative) in the course of the equalization scheme received by 
states or paid to other states per year. Regressions are based on annual data by state from 1970 to 











Effects of overrepresentation on Bailouts: Vertical Transfers 
  1 2 3 4 5 
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Votes Per Capita*Eastern States          1.725*** 
(0.597) 
 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  410 410 410 410 410 
R-squared  0.672 0.693 0.723 0.804 0.806 
The dependent variable is vertical (i.e. transfers from the federal government) to states per year. 
Regressions are based on annual data by state from 1970 to 2004. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis below point estimates. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 





The Effects of overrepresentation on state-level per capita spending 
 
































































































































































State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 410  410  410  410  410  410  370  410 
R-squared 0.989  0.989  0.988  0.992  0.974  0.962  0.905  0.73 
All dependent variables are measured per capita. Regressions are based on annual data by state from 1970 to 2004. Robust standard errors in 



































All dependent variables are measured as a share of total expenditures. Regressions are based on annual data by state from 1970 to 2004. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis below point estimates. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
  
Government 
Administration Education Police  Culture    Agriculture  Regional Aid State Enterprises
Votes Per Capita  -0.00471  -0.0614*** -0.0210***  -0.00933***    0.0283***  0.0506***  0.0447 
  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.074) 
Government Coalition 
 
-1.706** -2.044 -0.471 -0.539* 
 
-0.976* -4.690***  -1.92 
State  (0.845) (1.602)  (0.647)  (0.284)    (0.570) (1.325)  (5.466) 
Government Opposition 
 
-2.193*** 1.586  -0.373 -0.0439 
 
-0.641 -5.190***  0.214 
State  (0.825) (1.490)  (0.504)  (0.253)    (0.506) (1.313)  (2.898) 
Tax Revenue Per Capita 
 
0.0119*** 0.00508  -0.00510*** 0.000288 
 
0.00507*** 0.00297  0.0092 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.010) 
Population 
 
0.00163 0.0125***  0.00397***  0.000502 
 
-0.00310*** -0.00502*** 0.000482 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Population Density 
 
0.0147 -0.0337*  -0.00165  -0.00825* 
 
-0.000365 -0.028  -0.0156 
  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.064) 
Unemployment 
 
0.0297 -0.967*  -0.114  -0.489*** 
 
-0.380*** -1.203***  -1.807 
  (0.269)  (0.559)  (0.160)  (0.090)  (0.141)  (0.458)  (2.335) 
Votes Per Capita*Eastern  
 
0.0213 0.0452  0.0858***  0.000175 
 
0.0161 -0.136**  -0.0605 
States  (0.022)  (0.053)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.065)  (0.044) 
                
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  410  410  410  410  410  370  410 





The Effects of Overrepresentation on Government Efficiency 
 



































Votes Per Capita*Eastern 
States 
6.072*** -3.318  16.67*** 
 (0.846)  (2.480)  (1.979) 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 400  370  350 
R-squared 0.973  0.895  0.982 
The dependent variable is spending per capita in the three categories per state per year. 
Regressions are based on annual data by state from 1970 to 2004. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis below point estimates. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 






           





Total deficit per capita 
including budget deficits 
and transfers from the 
equalization scheme 
410 560.992 910.655 Federal statistical office 
(Fachserie 14, Reihe 3.1. 
Rechnungsergebnisse des 
öffentlichen Gesamthaushalts) 
and Federal Ministry of 
Finance ("Zweite Verordnung 
zue Durchfuehrung des 
Gesetzes ueber den 
Finanzausgleich zwischen 
Bund und Laendern im 
Ausgleichsjahr") 
Sum of Primary Deficit 
per Capita, VAT Transfers 
per Capita, Horizontal 
Transfers per Capita, and 
Vertical Transfers per 
capita in Euro 
           
Sum of all 
Transfers per 
Capita 
Sum of all transfers 
received by states per 
capita 
410 322.493 789.351 Federal statistical office  and 
Federal Ministry of Finance 
("Zweite Verordnung zue 
Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes 
ueber den Finanzausgleich 
zwischen Bund und Laendern 
im Ausgleichsjahr") 
Sum of VAT Transfers per 
Capita, Horizontal 
Transfers per Capita, and 
Vertical Transfers per 
capita in Euro 
           
VAT Transfers 
per Capita 
Value added tax 
transfers per capita 
410 95.542 486.911 Federal Ministry of Finance, 
"Zweite Verordnung zue 
Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes 
ueber den Finanzausgleich 
zwischen Bund und Laendern 
im Ausgleichsjahr" 
(Länderanteile Ust 
insgesamt - Länderanteil 
am örtlichen 
Umsatzsteueraufkommen 
- abgerechnete Anteile an 
der Einfuhrumsatzsteuer) / 
population    
  
 




Horizontal transfers per 
capita per state in the 
course of the 
equalization scheme 
410 58.618 186.923 Federal Statistical Office  Horizontal transfers / 
population 




Vertical transfers per 
capita per state 
410 168.333 315.480 Federal Statistical Office  Vertical transfers / 
population 
           
Debt per 
Capita 
Debt per capita  410 4.953 4.305 Federal Statistical Office  (Kreditmarktschulden im 




Rechtsgeschäfte + Innere 
Darlehen + 
Kassenverstärkungskredite 




           
Votes Per 
Capita 
Seats/votes per capita in 
the upper chamber 
410 1429.524 1130.122 Archives of the Bundesrat and 
the Federal Statistical Office 
Votes / 
population*1000000 
           
Government 
Coalition State 
States governed solely 
by parties that are also 
part of the federal 
government’s ruling 
coalition 
410 0.341 0.475 <www.election.de>, accessed 
on 15 September 2009 
Coalition counted as 
governing coalition for a 
certain state in a certain 
year if in power for more 
than half of the calendar 
year 






States governed solely 
by parties that are part of 
the opposition on the 
federal level 
410 0.471 0.500 <www.election.de>, accessed 
on 15 September 2009 
Coalition counted as 
governing coalition for a 
certain state in a certain 
year if in power for more 
than half of the calendar 
year 
           
Mixed State  States with a governing 
coalition whose parties 
are represented in the 
opposition and the 
governing coalition on 
the federal level 
410 0.188 0.391 <www.election.de>, accessed 
on 15 September 2009 
Coalition counted as 
governing coalition for a 
certain state in a certain 
year if in power for more 
than half of the calendar 
year 
           
Tax Revenue 
per Capita 
Tax revenue per capita  410 1117.735 664.996 Federal Ministry of Finance, 
"Zweite Verordnung zue 
Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes 
ueber den Finanzausgleich 
zwischen Bund und Laendern 
im Ausgleichsjahr" 
(Steuern nach dem 
Aufkommen + 
Gemeindeanteil an Est. 
und Zinsabschlagsteuer + 
Umsatzsteuer der 
Gemeinden + Sonstige 
Gemeindesteuern + 
Grundsteuer A + 
Grundsteuer B + 
Gewerbesteuer - 
Gewerbesteuerumlage im 
LFA) / population 
           
Population  State population  410 5678.140 4890.148 Federal Statistical Office  in 1000 
           
Population 
Density 
Population per square 
kilometer 
410 628.481 834.397 Federal Statistical Office  Population / km^2 * 1000 
           
Unemployment Unemployment  rate  410 9.064 5.375 Federal Statistical Office      
  
 
           
Vote East  Interaction of votes per 
capita in the upper 
chamber and if state is 
an eastern state joining 
the federation in 1990 
410 206.959 512.162   




State budget expenses on 
political administration 
per capita 
410 222.455 120.534 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
political organization / 
population 
           
Education Per 
Capita 
State budget expenses on 
primary and secondary 
education per capita 
410 420.887 224.745 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
primary and secondary 
education / population 
           
Police Per 
Capita 
State budget expenses on 
policing per capita 
410 148.443 97.321 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
police / population 
           
Culture Per 
Capita 
State budget expenses on 
cultural activities per 
capita 
410 60.731 45.595 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
cultural activities / 
population 
           
Agriculture Per 
Capita 
State budget expenses on 
agriculture per capita 
410 40.522 38.636 Federal Statistical Office, 
"Fachserie 14, Reihe 3.1. 
State budget expenses for 






           
Regional Per 
Capita 
State budget expenses on 
regional aids such as 
infrastructure per capita 
370 67.984 91.118 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
regional aid / population 




State budget expenses on 
state enterprises per 
capita 
410 71.157 63.788 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
state enterprises / 
population 
           
Hospital Per 
Capita 
State budget expenses on 
hospitals per capita 
410 136.079 140.417 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
hospitals / population 




Proportion of overall 
state budget spent on 
political administration 
410 75.308 11.984 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
political organization / 
total state budget *1000 
           
Relative 
Education 
Proportion of overall 
state budget spent on 
primary and secondary 
education 
410 143.726 21.289 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
primary and secondary 
education / total state 
budget * 1000    
  
 
           
Relative Police  Proportion of overall 
state budget spent on 
policing 
410 46.718 7.232 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
police / total state budget 
* 1000 
           
Relative 
Culture 
Proportion of overall 
state budget spent on 
cultural activities 
410 18.370 5.263 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
cultural activities / total 
state budget * 1000 
           
Relative 
Agriculture 
Proportion of overall 
state budget spent on 
agriculture 
410 14.929 9.973 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
agriculturen/ total state 
budget * 1000 
           
Relative 
Regional Aid 
Proportion of overall 
state budget spent on 
regional aids such as 
infrastructure 
370 17.422 17.071 Federal Statistical Office, 
"Fachserie 14, Reihe 3.1. 
Rechnungsergebnisse des 
öffentlichen 
Gesamthaushalts", starting in 
1974 
State budget expenses for 
regional aid / total state 
budget * 1000 
           
Relative State 
Enterprises 
Proportion of overall 
state budget spent on 
state owned enterprises 
410 26.470 35.127 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
state enterprises / total 
state budget * 1000 





Proportion of overall 
state budget spent on 
hospitals 
410 48.712 32.526 Federal Statistical Office, 




State budget expenses for 
hospitals / total state 
budget * 1000 




Police expenses per 
documented crime in the 
year before in Euro 
400 173.919 88.357 Police Crime Statistics of the 
German Federal Republic 
State budget expenses for 
policing / number of 
criminal cases 




Hospital expenses per 
documented patient in 
Euro 
370 5948.393 5713.048 Federal Statistical Office 





from 1990 onwards there is 
no individual data for the city 
states, for 2000 there are no 
data for Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern and Saarland 
State budget expenses on 
hospitals / number of 
patients in hospitals 






Primary and secondary 
education expenses per 
student in Euro 
320 4328.207 1598.889 Federal Statistical Office, 
"Allgemeinbildende Schulen 
Fachserie 11 Reihe 1", 
starting in 1980 
State budget expenses for 
primary and secondary 
education / number of 
pupils 
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